“So what? For readers who may not work in the Space Domain Awareness (SDA) community, the idea behind this article in its extrapolated form is the deployment of Machine Learning and algorithmic analysis as close to the tactical edge as possible. As the United States military continues to employ layered and integrated sensing networks, the temptation is to locate analysis at higher level echelons, far-removed from the data collection points.”

Cyber attacks against space systems often exploit the exact same vulnerabilities that cyber testers repeatedly uncover. Ground segments with remote access paths, trusted management networks, and maintenance mechanisms that can be abused to generate mission effects are common attack vectors when it comes to making mission effects via cyber-attack.

The application of the term space superiority has become frustratingly inconsistent within a military context. On one hand, the doctrinal definition in Joint Publication 3-14 relies on obscure statements like degree of control, freedom of access and action, and prohibitive interference while omitting any direct reference to military operations.